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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
NILE GENE NELSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040914-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for criminal nonsupport, a third degree felony, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-201 (West 2004), in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Denise P. Lindberg, presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion for a directed verdict, made at 
the close of the state's case-in-chief, where ample evidence showed that defendant failed to 
pay court-ordered child support while they were in needy circumstances? 
"[The reviewing court] review[s] for correctness the trial court's conclusion that the 
evidence established a prima facie case." State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, \ 8, 988 
P.2d 949 (citation omitted), cert denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). 
STATUTE 
The following statute is attached at Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-201 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of criminal non-support (West 2004). Rl 18-
20. At the close of the State's case-in-chief, defendant moved for a directed verdict, which 
the trial court denied. R210:149-54. A jury convicted defendant of the offense as charged. 
R128. The trial court sentenced defendant to a statutory zero-to-five-year term. However, 
the court suspended all but ninety days of the sentence, placed defendant on probation, and 
ordered him to pay restitution to the Office of Recovery Services ("ORS") at the rate of 
$658.00 per month. R166-68. Defendant timely appealed. R187. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State9s case-in-chief 
Christine Nelson was married to defendant from 1976 to 1997, at which point they 
divorced. R210:66-68, 77. During their marriage they had four children: Kodi, Brooklee, 
Casey, and Steven. R210:67; State's Ex. 1. Defendant and Christine also raised Christine's 
daughter of another union, Latosha.1 R210:67-68; State's Ex. 1. The divorce decree ordered 
defendant to pay not less than $909 per month in child support for all five children, pursuant 
1
 The trial court, without objection from defendant, informed the jury that Utah 
presumes that "a child born within the confines of a marriage is a child of the two parents 
that are legally married." R210:78. Christine admitted that she knowingly indicated in 
the divorce proceeding that Latasha was defendant's child. R210:80. 
2 
to the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines, until each child became eighteen years old 
or graduated from high school, whichever occurred later. R210:68,76-77; State'sEx. l;Def. 
Ex. 4B. From May 1, 1999 through February 28, 2003 ("nonsupport period"), the children 
who were under eighteen lived with her—all five beginning in May 1999, and three at time 
oftrial. R210:69. 
Following her divorce from defendant, Christine worked for the Utah State 
Treasurer's Office. R210:69, 90-91. In May 1999, she earned either $ 9.50 or $ 10.00 an 
hour. Id. In February 2003, she was earning $ 11.00 an hour. Id. During the nonsupport 
period, she received some assistance for her children from a couple of friends, family, and 
her church. R210:70-71. During the nonsupport period, her church paid her utilities a couple 
of times and provided some food. R210:71. Christine struggled a few times providing 
school clothes for her children: "They never went without, but they were not the top of the 
line dresses, either." Id. She also had a "hard time" providing food, having had to ask for 
help and "kind of watch what we do in order to make it." R210:71-72. There were also "a 
couple of times we've had to say no to a basketball team or something like that because of 
finances." R210:72. Even with the assistance of friends, family, and her church, Christine 
stated that her family was "impacted quite a bit": "I don't know how it would have turned 
out[,] but we definitely did need some help at certain times." R210:76. 
Christine did receive payments from ORS stemming from garnishment of defendant's 
unemployment checks, but she was unsure whether she received such payments during the 
nonsupport period. R210:72. She also received payments directly, albeit irregularly and 
3 
inconsistently, from defendant. Christine acknowledged, however, that "if [some money] 
was really needed, [defendant] seemed to be able to come up with it." R210:72-73. She also 
always gave defendant receipts for his direct payments. R210:73. Christine did not notify 
ORS of defendant's direct payments because she was generally working and was unaware 
that ORS had an open case on defendant. Id. However, she had recently given ORS what 
she thought was a fair statement of defendant's direct payments during the nonsupport 
period. R210:73-74. 
On cross-examination, Christine stated that defendant was served with a verified 
divorce complaint. R210:81-82; State's Ex. 1. He did not appear in the proceedings and a 
default decree of divorce and judgment was issued on August 7,1997. R210:80; State's Ex. 
1. At the time of the divorce, Christine was unemployed and had no income; defendant was 
employed and was earning $ 2,600.00 a month. R:210:91; State's Ex. 1. 
Defense counsel showed Christine her affidavit, written in response to an inquiry from 
ORS. R210:82, 99, 102-03. In the affidavit, Christine stated that she had not received any 
payments from defendant in 1999, 2000, and 2002 R.210:82-85. She testified, however— 
and the affidavit contained her handwritten explanation—that defendant had made some 
payments throughout the nonsupport period: "Nile doesn't pay child support on a regular 
basis[,] but there are many times when he had [sic] helped me out with $100 here and there. 
And I'm approximating that as $2,000." R21:84-86,88,92. Although the affidavit indicated 
that Christine's $2,000 estimate applied to 2001, she explained that her estimate related to 
the entire nonsupport period, but particularly in 2001. R210:85, 92, 97, 99-100. But 
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Christine acknowledged that in 2001 defendant made payments to her with checks that were 
almost all in amounts greater than $100. R210:93-95, 98. Def. Ex. 3. She also 
acknowledged giving defendant a receipt for $1500 worth of repairs he did on her house. 
R210:95. Christine did not keep records of defendant's payments and did not know on what 
specific dates defendant made payments, but she did not think defendant made payments 
every payday. R210:85, 89. She also stated that by the time of trial, defendant had become 
"very good about paying[, but a]t the time [in question] he wasn't." Id. 
Roberta Casados, an employee with ORS handled defendant's case file during the 
nonsupport period. R210:111-13. She prepared a chart recording defendant's payment 
history, State's Ex. 2 (Addendum B), that showed all payments that ORS had obtained from 
defendant, all by wage withholding: May 1999—$357.45; December 1999—$300; January 
2000—$500; February 2000—$400; and March 2000—$300. R210:l 16-18. The payment 
history also recorded two payments—$5,505.00 in 2001 and $2,496.38 in 2002—which 
defendant paid directly to Christine, the "custodial parent" ("CP"). R210:117-18; State's Ex. 
2. Ms. Casados testified that the amount of those payments were "actually arrived at in a 
[late 2003]meeting that was held between myself, the custodial parent, the non-custodial 
parent and counsels [sic]to arrive at the actual figures that were paid direct to the custodial 
parent so that he received proper credit." R210:118, 140-41. By the end of the nonsupport 
period, February 28,2003, defendant had accrued a balance of $26,895.17, even accounting 
for the payments defendant had made through ORS and to Christine. R210:120, 141-42; 
State's Ex. 2. 
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The payment history reflected that in May 1999, defendant was ordered to pay $909 
a month and that by February 2003 the payment had been reduced to $746 a month, reflecting 
the graduation of two of the children. R210:l 19; State's Ex. 2.2 ORS sought contact with 
defendant during the nonsupport period. R210:120. Annually, ORS sent notice to defendant, 
informing him of the current balance owed in his case, possible enforcement action in case 
of delinquency, and procedures for requesting modifications. R210:120. Demand for 
payment letters were also sent to defendant, stating the amount due and informing him that 
without satisfaction his case could be referred for criminal nonsupport. Two of those letters 
informed defendant that he could apply for a payment modification of his support order. 
R210:121, 124-25, 127-29. Defendant never responded to these notices. R210:129. ORS 
also contacted defendant by telephone four times during the nonsupport period. R210:124. 
Defendant never requested a modification during the nonsupport period. R210:145-46. 
On cross-examination, defendant elicited from Ms. Casados that ORS determined his 
child support obligation from the divorce decree and that the obligation was based on his 
stated income. R210:130-36. Defendant's support payments were determined from wage 
garnishments, information from Christine, and written receipts for support, including credit 
for defendant's repairs to Christine's house, and copies of the checks during the nonsupport 
period that he had given directly to Christine. R210:137-38,141-44. Ms. Casados stated that 
2
 The parties' minor children were born as follows: Kodi, December 8, 1980; 
Brooklee, November 26, 1982; Casey, June 19, 1985; Latosha, June 11, 1993; and 
Steven, July 19, 1995. State's Ex. 1. 
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at the parties' meeting in late 2003: "We kind of did the math together. I think we all kind 
of hashed that out at that meeting." R210:142-43 
Following Ms. Casados' testimony, defendant moved for a directed verdict, based on 
the prosecution's failure to show that defendant failed to pay child support in 18 months 
within any twenty-four month period or had accrued more than $10,000 in child support 
arrearage during the nonsupport period. R210:149-53. The trial court found that the 
prosecution had established a prima facie case and denied the motion. R210:153-54. 
Defendant's case 
Defendant testified that he consistently gave Christine money for his children's 
support during the nonsupport period whenever he got paid, mostly in cash. R210:155-56. 
However, he had no idea how much he had given her, because he did not keep records of 
most of it. R210:156. Any gap in the series of checks he gave Christine would have been 
due to his having misplaced the checks. R210:173-74. Defendant believed, however, that 
the checks he gave Christine, plus cash, reasonably reflected what he gave her during the 
nonsupport period. R.210:174-76. He claimed that he would call Christine after he got paid 
and would give her as much as she asked for and he was able to give her. R210:157. He 
would also give money directly to his children for clothes and shoes and food when they 
stayed with him. R210:157-59. He also performed $ 1,500 of repair and maintenance work 
on Christine's home during the summer of 2002. R210:159-62; Def. Ex. 5. He also claimed 
to have performed other repair and maintenance work for which he did not ask for receipts. 
R210:162. 
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Defendant claimed that to the best of his knowledge his children never wanted for 
clothes, shoes, medical care, adequate shelter, and access to team sports. R210:165-67. He 
asserted that his employment as a concrete worker was seasonal and that it was poor in the 
winter months. R210:167-68. Defendant claimed that when he was employed, he earned 
about $1,500 to $2,000 a month and not generally $2,600 a month as set out in the divorce 
decree. R210:169-72. 
Defendant stated, "I think I may have received one [letter from ORS] or something 
when I was staying in that camper." R210:176. Defendant acknowledged receiving a 
registered letter with the divorce decree, although he claimed to have no knowledge of "7850 
South 2nd East, Salt Lake City," the address to which the divorce decree was allegedly sent 
to him. R210:171, 176; State's Ex. 1. 
On cross-examination, defendant did not recall being served with the divorce decree, 
even when shown a return of service indicating personal service at 7850 South 200 East. 
R210:180-81; State5 s Ex. 3. Defendant acknowledged that he never attempted to modify the 
divorce decree to lower the support payments or to exclude himself as Latosha's biological 
father. R210:183-84. Defendant also acknowledged that he may have received letters from 
ORS, but he did not read them. R210:189-90. 
In response to questions from the jury, defendant acknowledged that his payments 
directly to his children were gifts, not child support. R210:188. Defendant also claimed that 
he did not pay support to ORS, as directed in the divorce decree because Christine needed 
8 
his support immediately, and he believed that payment to her would be delayed if he first sent 
ittoORS. R210:191. 
On rebuttal, however, Ms. Casados testified that a check could issue to the support 
recipient within twenty-four hours, at which point it could be mailed or picked up directly 
by the recipient. R210:192-93. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Because the 
motion was made at the close of the State's case-in-chief and never renewed at the close of 
all the evidence, review of defendant's challenge to the court's ruling is limited to evidence 
adduced only during the State's case-in-chief. That evidence, viewed favorably to the State, 
showed that defendant committed third degree criminal nonsupport because he had accrued 
an arrearage in excess of $10,000 while his minor children were in "needy circumstances." 
A payment history prepared by ORS, following a meeting of all parties and their counsel, 
reflected defendant's support by check, cash, and services given to his ex-wife. That 
payment history also showed that defendant had accrued an arrearage of almost $27,000. 
Defendant's challenge that the evidence did not show that he failed to pay support 
while he children were in needy circumstances was not preserved in the trial court, and 
defendant does not argue plain error on appeal. Therefore, the Court should not consider it. 
In any case, the evidence showed, by defendant's ex-wife's reliance on other sources of 




THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS MADE AT THE END OF DEFENDANT'S 
CASE-IN-CHIEF BECAUSE THERE WAS EVIDENCE SHOWING 
DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF CRIMINAL NONSUPPORT 
A person commits third degree criminal nonsupport when any of his minor children 
are in "needy circumstances" and he knowingly fails to support them in each of 18 individual 
months within a 24-month period or by accruing a $ 10,000 arrearage. Utah Code Ann. § 76-
7-201 (1), (3)(c) (West 2004). Defendant principally contends that the State failed to show 
that the total arrearage on defendant's child support obligation was in excess of $105000 or 
that he failed to faithfully pay support. Aplt. Br. at 15-22. He also contends that the fully 
marshaled evidence fails to show that he did not support his minor children while they were 
in needy circumstances. Aplt. Br. at 22-24. Contrary to defendant's contention, the evidence 
amply supports the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a directed verdict. 
A, The circumstances of defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of evidence 
limits review to evidence adduced during the State's case-in-chief. 
At the close of the State's case, defendant moved for a directed verdict. R210:150. 
Defendant argued that the prosecution had failed to show that defendant had failed to pay 
child support during 18 months within any 24-month period or had accrued more than 
$10,000 in child support arrearage during the nonsupport period. R210:149-53. The trial 
court denied the motion. R210:153-54. The court held that the prosecution had established 
a prima facie case that defendant had made neither regular nor sufficient support payments. 
R210:153-54. Consequently, the court denied the motion. Id. 
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At trial, defendant never renewed his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence after 
he moved for a directed verdict. R210. On appeal, defendant identifies the issue as 
"[wjhether the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for a directed verdict . . . .?" 
Aplt. Br. at 1. He correctly notes that this issue is preserved at the point in the record where 
he moved for a directed verdict. Aplt. Br. at 2, 15 (citing R210:150-51, 153-54). 
Review of the trial court's denial of a motion for a directed verdict made after the 
State's case-in-chief is limited to evidence adduced during the State's case-in-chief. State 
v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, H 40, 70 P.3d 1110"A defendant's motion to dismiss for 
insufficient evidence at the conclusion of the State's case in chief requires the trial court to 
determine whether the defendant must proceed with the introduction of evidence in his 
defense.'") (citations omitted). See State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, % 9,988 P.2d 949 
(limiting review of the sufficiency of evidence in "appeal focuse[d] on the denial of the 
motion to dismiss at the close of the State's case-in-chief... to the evidence adduced by the 
prosecution in its case-in-chief," and specifically holding "evidence presented by the 
defendant... [is] not relevant to our inquiry"); State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 573-74 (Utah 
App. 1991) (finding prima facie case based on facts established at the close of the State's 
case-in-chief); Nguyen v. State, 580 So. 2d 122, 122-23 (Ala Ct. App. 1991) ("[W]here the 
sufficiency of the evidence is tested by a motion for a judgment of acquittal, we may examine 
only that evidence which was before the court at the time the motion was made.") (citation 
omitted). 
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Based on the foregoing, this Court's review of the matter precludes consideration of 
any testimony made after the motion for a directed verdict—defendant's testimony and Ms. 
Casados' rebuttal testimony. This conclusion is reinforced by defendant's failure on appeal 
to argue exceptional circumstances or that the trial court committed plain error in sending the 
case to the jury following the close of all the evidence. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 
f 17, 10 P.3d 346 (requiring a showing of plain error upon an unpreserved claim that 
evidence was insufficient to send case to the jury). See also State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 
547 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) "[B]ecause defendant 'does not argue that "exceptional 
circumstances" or "plain error" justifies a review of the[se] issue[s],' this court will 'decline 
to consider [them] on appeal.'") (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 
1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995)). Thus, all of defendant's argument relying on his testimony that 
he repaired and improved Christine's house "for credit on his child support obligation" is 
irrelevant to the disposition of the trial court's ruling on his motion for a directed verdict. 
Aplt.Br. at 16-17, 21. 
B. The standard of review. 
On a motion for a directed verdict, "[i]f the State fails to produce 'believable evidence 
of all the elements of the crime charged,' State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, % 13, 20 P.3d 300 
(quotations and citations omitted), the trial court must dismiss the charges." Hamilton, 2003 
UT 111, |^ 40. This Court will uphold a trial court's decision to submit a case to the jury if, 
"upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, [the 
court] conclude[s] that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the 
12 
elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 
525, 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Dibello, 780 P.3d 1221,1225 (Utah 1989)). 
In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a trial court's denial of a motion to 
dismiss or for directed verdict, "the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
State." State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 68 157 P.2d 258, 260 (1945). 
C. The State presented evidence from which the jury 
could have found that defendant was guilty of 
criminal nonsupport beyond a reasonable doubt. 
To prove defendant guilty of third degree criminal nonsupport, the State was required 
to show that defendant knowingly failed to provide support for his minor children when they 
were in needy circumstances or would be in such circumstances if not for the support of 
another and that he failed to provide support during 18 months within any 24-month period 
or his total arrearage was more than $10,000.3 
3
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-201 (West 2004), provides: 
(1) A person commits criminal nonsupport if, having a spouse, a child, or children 
under the age of 18 years, he knowingly fails to provide for the support of the spouse, 
child, or children when any one of them: 
(a) is in needy circumstances; or 
(b) would be in needy circumstances but for support received from a source other 
than the defendant or paid on the defendant's behalf. 
(3) Criminal nonsupport is a felony of the third degree if the actor: 
(c) commits the crime of nonsupport in each of 18 individual months within any 
24-month period, or the total arrearage is in excess of $10,000. 
13 
/. The evidence amply shows that defendant 
accrued an arrearage in excess of $10,000. 
As noted, defendant principally contends that the State failed to make a prima facie 
case by failing to show that his arrearage was in excess of $10,000. Aplt. Br. at 15. He 
contends that the State's evidence of his payments consisted only of (1) Christine's 
inaccurate and unreliable $2000 estimate to ORS, unsupported by any record-keeping, of 
defendant's direct payments to her in cash and by check; and (2) ORS's incomplete records 
of defendant's lost and unrecorded payments. Aplt. Br. at 15-22. Defendant repeatedly 
argues that these records do not include all of the direct cash and check payments he gave 
directly to Christine because she kept no records. Aplt. Br. at 16-22. 
Contrary to defendant's contention, the marshaled evidence shows that defendant's 
arrearage was clearly in excess of $10,000 long before the end of the nonsupport period: 
• The parties' divorce decree ordered defendant to pay child support 
in the amount of $909 a month for all five children named in the 
decreee, until each child became 18 years old or graduated from 
high school (R210:R210:68, 76-77; State's Ex. 1; Def. Ex. 4B); 
• Defendant was served with the divorce complaint (R210:81-82); 
• Christine always gave defendant receipts for his direct payments and 
defendant had receipts for everything he paid for (R210:73, 101); 
• ORS became responsible for collections on defendant's child 
support obligation (R210:111-13); 
• ORS determined defendant's support obligation from the divorce 
decree, based on his stated income, $2,600 a month (R210:130-36 
State's Ex. 1; Defendant's Ex. 4B); 
• The ORS caseworker assigned to defendant's case prepared a chart 
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recording defendant's payment history during the nonsupport 
period—May 1, 1999 through February 28, 2003 (R210:l 16-17; 
State's Ex. 2); 
• The payment history showed all payments ORS obtained from 
defendant, which was determined from wage garnishments, information 
from Christine, written receipts and copies of the checks defendant 
gave directly to Christine, and $1500 credit for repair work (R210:95, 
137-38, 141-42, 144); 
• The payment history includes two payments—$5,505.00 in 2001 
and $2,496.38 in 2002—which defendant paid directly to Christine, 
the "custodial parent" ("CP"). R210:l 17-18; State's Ex. 2. 
• The case worker testified that the amount of those payments were based 
on a meeting at which defendant and Christine and their respective 
counsel were present "to arrive at the actual figures that were paid 
direct to the custodial parent so that [defendant] received proper credit" 
and at which defendant presented the checks he had given Christine 
and the receipts he had received from her (R210:118, 140-41); 
• The payment history accurately reflected defendant's decreased support 
obligation as his two eldest children, Kodi and Brooklee graduated 
from high school or reached the age of eighteen (R210:137-37, 148-49; 
State's Ex. 1 & 2; Def s Ex. 4B); 
• During the nonsupport period—May 1, 1999 through February 28, 
2003—ORS sent defendant annual notices, informing him 
of the current balance owed in his case, possible enforcement 
action in case of delinquency, and procedures for requesting 
modifications (R210:120); 
• During the nonsupport period, ORS also sent defendant demand-for-
payment letters, stating the amount due and informing him that 
without satisfaction his case could be referred for criminal actiont; 
two of those letters also informed defendant that he could apply for a 
payment modification of his support order (R210:121, 124-25, 127-29); 
• Defendant never responded to the foregoing notices, nor did he ever 
request a modification of his support obligation (R210:129, 145-46); 
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• Defendant had accrued an arrearage of $ 10,802.55 by July 305 2000; 
defendant's arrearage was never less than $10,000 in the remaining 31 
months before the end of the nonsupport period, February 28, 2003, at 
which point the defendant's arrearage was $26,895.17 (R210:120, 
141-42; State's Ex. 2). 
The foregoing facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the State, amply show that 
the State established a prima facie case that defendant had accrued an arrearage of $10,000 
during the nonsupport period. In brief, the facts show that defendant was aware that he had 
been ordered to pay support for his four minor children, including another child for whom 
he never declined responsibility. Defendant was also notified of the amount he was required 
to pay. The payment history reflected all the sources of payment that defendant made toward 
his support obligation. Long before the end of the nonsupport period, defendant's arrearage 
became greater than $10,000, notwithstanding credits to his account. 
Defendant repeatedly challenges the ORS payment history because it was undisputed 
that Christine did not keep records and her estimate—that during the nonsupport period 
defendant gave her about $2,000—was patently untrustworthy because the checks he gave 
her (mainly during 2001) were far in excess of that estimate. Aplt. Br. at 16-22. 
The State does not dispute these facts. Christine acknowledged that she did not keep 
records. (R210:89). Her estimate, that defendant "helped [her] out with a $100 here and 
there," approximating about $2,000 during the nonsupport period, was inaccurate. R210:86, 
88, 92. Defendant's checks marked "child support," made to Christine between January 28, 
2001 and April 30, 2002, alone total $5,130. Def s Ex. 3. 
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These facts, however, are insufficent to defeat the State's prima facie case of the 
element that defendant had accrued an arrearage of $10,000. The checks span a period of 
sixteen months. Def s Ex. 3. To challenge the State's case-in-chief for that period, 
defendant introduced only the checks. R210:93-97; Def s Ex. 3. He never introduced any 
receipts for cash that he allegedly gave Christine during that period. R210. Viewed 
favorably to the State, it is improbable that during the 16-month period, which began months 
after defendant had already accrued an arrearage of $10,000, that defendant was also giving 
Christine support payments in cash. It is still more improbable that even if he were also 
giving her cash in addition to the checks that he could have fulfilled his support obligation 
of $12,464 during that 16-month period, from January 1, 2001 through April 30, 2002. 
State's Ex. 2. Moreover, any inaccuracy in Christine's estimate of defendant's support is 
irrelevant. The payment history indicates that ORS gave defendant credit for two 
amounts—$5,505.00 and $2,496.38, a total of $8,001.38, "paid direct to [Christine]" in 2001 
and 2002. State's Ex. 2. These amounts reflect the outcome of a meeting at which defendant 
and his counsel were present and from which ORS gave defendant credit for support given 
in the form of cash, check, and repair work in excess of any sum he adduced evidence for. 
R210:118, 141-42; State's Ex. 2. Defendant's arrearage was in excess of $10,000 despite 
these credits. In sum, defendant has failed to show that evidence that he had accrued an 
arrearage of $10,000 was insufficient to survive a motion for a directed verdict. 
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2. Defendant's contention that the evidence fails to establish that he 
knowingly failed to provide for his children while they were in needy 
circumstances is unpreserved and contrary to the evidence. 
Defendant argues that "the marshaled evidence, even when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the State, failed to show that [defendant] knowingly failed to provide for his 
children while they were in needy circumstances." Aplt. Br. at 22. In support, defendant 
notes only that Christine testified that he was not consistent in paying support and "'that there 
were several times when we were in a bind,' but that' it seemed like if [the money] was really 
needed, [defendant] seemed able to come up with i t ' " Aplt. Br. at 22-23 (citing R210:72-73, 
90). He further argues that he provided support in a variety of alternative ways and the 
checks show that he made consistent payments. Aplt. Br. at 23. 
a. To the extent defendant claims that the State failed to show that his 
children were in needy circumstances, the claim is unpreserved. 
"[I]n general, appellate courts will not consider an issue, including constitutional 
arguments, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or 
the case involves exceptional circumstances." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, f^ 13,95 P.3d 276 
(citing Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11).4 "[T]he issue must be 'sufficiently raised to a "level of 
consciousness" before the trial court and must be supported by evidence "'" Id. (citation 
4
 "To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that '(i) [a]n error 
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is 
undermined.5" Holgate, 200 UT 74, ^ f 13 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 
(Utah 1993)). 
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omitted). The reviewing court will decline to review an argument unpreserved in the trial 
court and unasserted under the plain error doctrine on appeal. See State v. Hodges, 2002 UT 
117, \ 5,63 P3d 66 (declining to review unpreserved argument "[b]ecause defendant has not 
asserted either of the exceptions to the general rule-plain error or exceptional 
circumstances"). 
Here, in moving for a directed verdict, defendant argued only that the evidence was 
insufficient to show that defendant had accrued an arrearage of $ 10,000. R210:149-53. He 
never argued that the evidence was insufficient to show that his children were in needy 
circumstances or would be but for the assistance provided by others during the nonsupport 
period. Id. Thus, defendant never gave the trial court the opportunity to consider the issue 
of needy circumstances in ruling on his motion. On appeal, defendant does not argue that 
the trial court committed plain error in denying his motion because it did not consider 
whether his children were in needy circumstances or that exceptional circumstances 
precluded the argument. Aplt. Br. at 22-24. This Court should therefore decline to consider 
defendant's contention. In any case, the evidence showed that defendant's children were in 
needy circumstances. 
b. The evidence shows that defendant's children were in needy 
circumstances or would have been so but for the assistance of others. 
Defendant "knowingly fail[ed] to provide for the support of the spouse, child, or 
children when any one of them [was] in needy circumstances[,] or would [have been] in 
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needy circumstances but for support received from a source other than the defendant or paid 
on the defendant's behalf." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-201(1) (West 2004). 
Christine testified to the following facts as to her and her children's financial 
circumstances during the nonsupport period: 
• She and her children had to receive help from friends (R210:70); 
• She had to seek help from her family a couple of different times (R210:70); 
• Her mother helped her (R210:70); 
• She borrowed money from her father for clothing when she first 
started working (R210:70); 
• She had to borrow money from her friends (R210:71); 
• Her church had to help her on a couple of occasions 
with finances (R210:70-71); 
• She paid for her children's medical and dental insurance, even though 
the divorce decree ordered defendant to pay that expense (R210:71; 
State's Ex. 1); 
• She had hardships providing clothing for her children because of the large 
size of her family—"We struggled a few times with school clothes. . . . 
(R210:71); 
• She had hardships providing food—"Yeah, we've had a hard time. We've 
had to ask for help and we've had to, you know, we've had to kind 
of watch what we do in order to make it" (R. 210:71-72); 
• There had been a couple of times when "we've had to say no to a 
basketball team or something like that because of finances" (R210:72); 
• She did not know how things might have turned out without help from 
family, friends, and her church—"[M]y children were already 
impacted quite a bit. I don't know how it would have turned out, 
but we definitely did need some help as certain times (R210:76). 
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Christine's self-effacing statements that family, parents, friends, and church each 
helped her out a "couple" of times, that she had some "hardship" providing appropriate 
clothing for her five children, that a "couple" of times her children were deprived of 
opportunities at sports, and that providing food was an on-going challenge, attest to her and 
her children's needy circumstances. Her complete statement, upon which defendant relies, 
"[Defendant's support] wasn't regular and it wasn't consistent but. . . it seemed like if it was 
really needed, he seemed to be able to come up with it," only highlights Christine's 
abstemious lifestyle in the absence of defendant's inconsistent and delinquent support. 
R210:73. 
Defendant attempts to buoy up his claim that Christine and the children were not in 
needy circumstances by referencing services he provided to improve Christine's house and 
his purchasing of clothes for the children. Aplt. Br. at 23. However, all of the evidence 
defendant cites was introduced in the defense's case, after defendant moved for a directed 
verdict and the trial court denied it. R210:149-54. Consequently, this evidence is "not 
relevant to [this Court's] inquiry" of the issue on appeal, to wit: the propriety of the trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, 
\ 9. Moreover, at most it only puts the matter at issue, thereby presenting the jury with a 
factual dispute to resolve. 
In sum, the fully marshaled evidence shows that defendant's children were in needy 
circumstances. Further, the evidence supports the trial court's denial of defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict. That evidence, viewed favorably to the State, shows that not only were 
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defendant's children in needy circumstances, but also that defendant failed to support them 
in accruing an arrearage in excess of $10,000. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm defendant's conviction. 




Assistant Attorney General 
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OFFENSES AGAINST THE FAMILY 
PART 2. NONSUPPORT AND SALE OF CHILDREN 
§ 76—7—201. Criminal nonsupport 
(1) A person commits criminal nonsupport if, having a spouse, a child, or 
children under the age of 18 years, he knowingly fails to provide for the support 
of the spouse, child, or children when any one of them: 
(a) is in needy circumstances; or 
(b) would be in needy circumstances but for support received from a 
source other than the defendant or paid on the defendant's behalf. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), criminal nonsupport is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(3) Criminal nonsupport is a felony of the third degree if the actor: 
(a) has been convicted one or more times of nonsupport, whether in this 
state, any other state, or any court of the United States; 
(b) committed the offense while residing outside of Utah; or 
(c) commits the crime of nonsupport in each of 18 individual months 
within any 24-month period, or the total arrearage is in excess of $10,000. 
(4) For purposes of this section "child" includes a child born out of wedlock 
whose paternity has been admitted by the actor or has been established in a 
civil suit. 
(5)(a) In a prosecution for criminal nonsupport under this section, it is an 
affirmative defense that the accused is unable to provide support. Voluntary 
unemployment or underemployment by the defendant does not give rise to that 
defense. 
(b) Not less than 20 days before trial the defendant shall file and serve on 
the prosecuting attorney a notice, in writing, of his intention to claim the 
affirmative defense of inability to provide support. The notice shall specifi-
cally identify the factual basis for the defense and the names and addresses of 
the witnesses who the defendant proposes to examine in order to establish 
the defense. 
(c) Not more than ten days after receipt of the notice described in Subsec-
tion (5)(b), or at such other time as the court may direct, the prosecuting 
attorney shall file and serve the defendant with a notice containing the names 
and addresses of the witnesses who the state proposes to examine in order to 
contradict or rebut the defendant's claim. 
(d) Failure to comply with the requirements of Subsection (5)(b) or (5)(c) 
entitles the opposing party to a continuance to allow for preparation. If the 
court finds that a party's failure to comply is the result of bad faith, it may 
impose appropriate sanctions. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-7-201; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 21; Laws 1995, c. 289, § 1, eff. 
May 1, 1995; Laws 1999, c. 89, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999. 
ADDENDUM B 
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